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Mobile service platforms are IT-based marketplaces that have become the source of competitive advantages. 
Aligning the interests of stakeholders by establishing effective governance mechanisms is central to the success 
of mobile service platforms. This phenomenon ignites research in many disciplines, which results in a 
fragmented understanding of mobile service platforms. This paper is a first step towards establishing a 
comprehensive understanding of the role of governance mechanisms in mobile service platforms. We review the 
literature and develop a theoretical modular framework which provides an outline for the analysis and 
conceptualization of mobile service platform governance. This also provides help to identify promising research 
avenues. 
 
Keywords: mobile services, mobile ecosystems, governance, control 
1 Introduction 
Successful platforms for mobile services like Apple’s App Store serve as an important source of 
competitive advantage for the platform owner (Iyer et al., 2007; Jansen et al., 2009; Schlagwein et al., 
2010). Mobile service platforms address fast-changing markets by leveraging the capabilities of third-
party service providers for offering innovative services (De Reuver and Bouwman, 2011; Querbes-
Revier, 2011). Consequently, mobile service platforms are characterized through programming 
interfaces that allow third party developers to contribute services (Ballon et al., 2008; Querbes-Revier, 
2011). 
The success of a mobile service platform is determined by the capability of the platform provider to 
align the interests of two dependent actors: servic providers and service consumers (Evans and 
Schmalensee, 2007; Iyer et al., 2007; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Innovative services with fair 
conditions in pricing and digital rights management attract consumers. Third party service providers 
seek profitable opportunities with predictable and reliable platform functions. An effective platform 
governance enables providers to align the interests of all the stakeholders (De Reuver, 2009; Eaton et 
al., 2011; Lerner et al., 2006; West, 2003) and is defined as the direction, c trol, and coordination of 
platform resources. It consists of formal and informal rules (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2010; 
Vandaele et al., 2007).  
The design of governance mechanisms and the subsequent effects ignite research in many disciplines, 
which results in a fragmented understanding of effectiv  governance mechanisms for mobile service 
platforms (Kohlborn et al., 2009; Tiwana et al., 2010). For instance, the literature on platform 
governance studies governance mechanisms through different lenses (e.g. third-party developer or 
consumer), because they differ in relevance to the disciplines. At present, studies in the field of 
governance mechanisms  lack an integrated perspective (Haaker et al., 2006).  
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework fr the conceptualization of governance in mobile 
service platforms as a first step towards establishing a comprehensive understanding of the role of 
governance mechanisms. The foundation of the framework is a review of the literature on governance 
mechanism in the discipline of Information Systems and its reference disciplines. We contribute to the 
discussion on effective governance mechanisms by consolidating critical issues of design choices 
when establishing governance mechanisms for mobile service platforms. In addition, this framework 
helps to identify promising avenues for further research. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section we define mobile service 
platform governance and describe its elements. Following this, we outline our research design. Then, 
we examine the elements and aspects of platform governance as discussed in literature. Based on this, 
we present and discuss our framework. The paper concludes with a summary of our findings and 
research opportunities. 
2 Definition of Mobile Service Platform Governance 
2.1 Elements of a Mobile Platform Governance Concep t 
Several authors have published definitions of platform governance. Brousseau & Penard (2007) 
conclude that “[g]overnance structures are built to manage conflict, reach consensus and 
constitutionally minimize this danger”. However, deR uver and Bouwman (2011) extend this view. 
They recognize platform governance not only as structu es, but also as “power and process to organize 
collective action” and refer to governance as “the m chanisms that are used to safeguard, coordinate 
and adapt the exchange of resources” (De Reuver and Bouwman, 2011). Another definition is given by 
Ghazawneh & Henfridsson (2010): “direction, control, and coordination of third-party developers 
through the common resources of a platform”. Finally, Tiwana et al. (2010) determine platform 
governance as a concept that regulates “who makes what decisions about a platform”. 
We conclude that there is no established definition of platform governance as the topic emerged just 
recently. Comparing the definitions shows that platform governance is a multi-dimensional concept, 
which firstly controls the decision-making process in a platform (Tiwana et al., 2010). Second, 
platform governance is the structure, power, processes, and control mechanisms that are applied by the 
platform owner to achieve his aims. We further conclude that governance has to be dynamically 
managed and implemented to flexibly react to changing conditions in the ecosystem (Busquets, 2010; 
Rudmark and Ghazawneh, 2011). This includes control-concepts as a subset of platform governance 
(Tiwana et al., 2010). Hence, we argue that controls are vital elem nts of platform governance. 
2.2 Elements of a Mobile Service Platform Governanc e Concept 
To review and evaluate the literature on mobile servic  platform governance, our study is based on the 
elements of a mobile platform and its ecosystem, as the value of a platform depends on its externalities 
(Basole and Karla, 2011; Haaker et al., 2006). The major stakeholders which are revealed in literature 
are the platform owner, third-party developers and consumers. We focus on these, because the way they 
are influenced by governance is very important for platform success (Kohlborn et al., 2009; Levina, 
2002). As follows, we describe the three different governance levels derived from literature. 
Market structure: Tiwana et al. (2010) emphasize on the particular relevance of the fit between 
platform design, platform governance and the enviromental dynamics of the platform. The 
environmental dynamics result from competitive platforms and legislative, techno-economic, or socio-
economic factors which are influencing the viability of the platform. A market structure contains all the 
rules for the exchange and value creation on the platform. Thus, it designates the business model of IT-
based platforms (Neumann, 2007), which is an important element for the viability of the platform 
(Ballon et al., 2008; Basole and Karla, 2011). 
Governance configuration: It is directly derived from the formal and informal rules contained in the 
market structure. The platform owner has to exercis certain rights to implement the platform 
governance (Tiwana et al., 2010). The successful implementation of these rights, i.e., the configuration 
of the platform is a function of the relative power of the platform owner (Ballon, 2009; De Reuver et 
al., 2010; Gawer and Henderson, 2007). De Reuver (2011) suggests that the following, not mutually-
exclusive core concepts govern activities in organiz tional networks: contract-based, power-based and 
trust-based. This approach was directly applied and empirically tested in a value network environment. 
We apply these concepts as classification scheme for the analysis of the literature on platform 
governance. 
Control mechanisms: Furthermore, control is an important element of platform governance. On the one 
hand, control is an undeniable part of the platform governance definition. On the other hand, 
researchers suggest that the view of platform governance from the perspective of control might be 
valuable. It enables the measurement of the effects of governance decisions, which are made in the 
derivation of the governance configuration (Ballon, 2009; Bergman et al., 2007; Eaton et al., 2011; 
Rudmark and Ghazawneh, 2011). Thereby they give the opportunity to adjust the market- and or 
governance strategy (Eaton et al., 2011; Jain, 2011; Rudmark and Ghazawneh, 2011). 
In sum, five interesting questions can be raised to es ablish a comprehensive understanding of platform 
governance and to reveal research opportunities: 
• To what extent is power involved in deriving a governance configuration from a market structure? 
• How is a configuration implemented by the governance concepts contract, power and trust? 
• To what extent is control involved in platform governance? 
• What are the stakeholder relations with the biggest impact on platform success? 
• Which governance mechanisms affect which stakeholder relationships the most? 
• Do the elements of platform governance vary orthogonally or are they related? 
Consequently the elements of a platform, with their individual connections, have to be analyzed to 
gather a complete picture of the internal processes of a platform.  
3 Methodology of the Data Collection and Analysis 
3.1 Research Design 
We followed the suggestions of Webster and Watson for conducting the literature review (Webster 
and Watson, 2002). Our first considerations applied to the approach of a keyword search. As Levy and 
Ellis (2006) state keywords in IS literature show a short lifespan caused by rapid progress in the 
research field. But, while some keywords are not sus ainable, their underlying theories are (Levy and 
Ellis, 2006). Accordingly, to reduce the risk of missing important research contributions, we did not 
rely solely on a keyword search but also applied a forward and backward search.  
First, we applied an unguided search by employing standard and extension phrases as presented by 
Vom Brocke et al. (Vom Brocke t al., 2009). The terms for this search were derived from two sources. 
On the one hand, we derived keywords from the definition. On the other hand, we sought concepts, 
which are interchangeably applied to the term "platform" in literature. The concepts “electronic 
market”, “multi-sided platform”, “two-sided market”, “two-sided platform” and “service ecosystem” 
are considered as standard phrases with the terms “mobile”, “business model”, ”control”, “governance” 
and “management” as extension phrases. Papers had to include at least one standard phrase. By 
searching through the databases EBSCO and Google Scholar with these phrases, we identified 27 
papers. We omitted literature outside the mobile world as its applicability to mobile platform 
governance poses an unsolved topic. 
 Figure 1. Occurrences of the relevant papers according to IS reference disciplines 
In order to capture not only the broad spectrum of research in this area, but also to reach a deeper 
understanding, a forward and backward search is applied (Webster and Watson, 2002). We ranked our 
findings by topic relevance and outlet quality as stated by VHB-JOURQUAL. Further, the five papers 
with the highest relevance and publication quality were defined as core papers. The core papers then 
formed the starting point of our forward and backward search. We identified 8 additional papers, of 
which we omitted five paper based on content analysis. A listing of the final 30 publications is depicted 
in figure 3. 
3.2 Final Set of Analysed Papers 
Grover et al. (2006) identified four reference disciplines to the Information Systems discipline: 
Organizational Science (OS), Economics (ECN), Computer Science (CS) and Marketing (MKT). To 
make a first analysis, we assign our findings to these disciplines and the year of publication (see fig. 1).  
The results show that Information Systems literature is at present the dominant outlet for research on 
platform governance. However this dominance emerged only five years ago. In previous years, we can 
report multiple publications in the field of Economics and one in Computer Science and Organizational 
Science. This shows that research on mobile service platforms turns towards the underlying IT artifact 
(Robey et al., 2008). Furthermore, since 2007 a stable and rising interest can be identified with a peak 
in 2011. In sum, the high amount of papers published recently combined with the fact that there are 
multiple conference papers (6) among the analyzed articles, as recommended by Webster and Watson 
(Webster and Watson, 2002), reveals that latest resea ch results are included in our reflection. 
Furthermore, the quality of our findings is appropriate. Significant numbers of publications are from the
Journal “Information System Research” and the International Conference on Information Systems as 
well as other major conferences and journals. We encou ter a great variety of authors researching in 
this topic and yet four core scientists can be ident fi d: De Reuver, Ghazawneh, Bouwman, and Tiwana. 
Finally we find that research in this field is mainly done through qualitative interpretative and mainly 
non-empirical methods (cf. table 2). Only two research papers applied also a quantitative method (De 
Reuver and Bouwman, 2011; Tiwana, 2009). Still, generalizable and empirically tested insights on 
platform governance are not derived. Empirical studies are rare in research on platform performance 
(Methlie and Pedersen, 2007).  
4 Mobile Platform Governance – State of the Art 
4.1 Covered Elements of Mobile Platform Governance in Literature 
We analysed the literature for the appearances of market structure, governance configurations, and 
control mechanisms. Results are depicted in figure 2. Management literature focuses on strategic 
aspects, which are referenced to governance aspects five out of eleven times. In contrast, IS literature 
focuses more on governance configurations and control aspects. All in all, the market structure is 
dominating the scene, because it is a prerequisite for the derivation of a governance concept. In 
summary, only six out of the 30 papers omit the embdding of governance. These publications refer to 
the market structure itself.  
 
Figure 2. Occurrence of platform governance elements sorted by number of paper (cf. table 2, 
descending order) and discipline  
In a next step, we focus on the different stakeholders mentioned in literature. Third-party providers a e
neglected because these strategic partners are merely integrated into the infrastructure of the platform 
(Barros and Dumas, 2006). The definition of the platform owner refers to any kind of subject that has 
the power of decision-making, control and guidance, as these are the common rights one has 
concerning his property. This involves that the owner provides the infrastructure for development on 
the one hand and the distribution of the software and services on the other (Jansen et al., 2009). As a 
developer, literature regards anyone who creates value through contributing applications and software, 
may it be that they are performing a complete new srvice or just an aggregation of existing services. 
In this manner the developers are the creators of the value. At last the term customer is defined. We 
define it as the people or organizations who make use of the platform distribution channels to access 
value adding software and services (Ballon, 2009; Riedl et al., 2009). 
Examining the intensity of research on governance in respect to the relationships between the 
stakeholders we find a serious cluster in publications regarding the owner to developer relation. 
Following at great distance, the owner to customer relation is researched. The rest is but a mixture of 
other relations yet not well understood (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Analysis of research on the stakeholder relations 
Measure Owner to Developer Owner to Consumer Owner to Other 
Percentage of overall analyzed publications 96,8% 25,8% 19,4% 
Furthermore, we focus on the core concepts, which are used in governance configurations on the 
different relations. Approaching power-based governance at first, we notice that the term power is 
rather vague. It can be further conceptualized by introducing the terms authority and hierarchy. Taking 
these expressions in combination power resembles how an organization can decide on actions over 
others (De Reuver and Bouwman, 2011). One manifestation of power-based governance is for example 
the application of strict development rules, which can be directly implemented by contracts. In general 
contracts are a form of legal binding between parties concerned with their collaboration. As 
collaboration is a quite loose notion, it includes a pects such as financial aspects, management 
concerns, outcome agreements, property rights, external relations and conflict resolution (De Reuver 
and Bouwman, 2011). Trust-based governance is related to reliability and benevolence aspects. 
Reliability is the ability of a subject to act as agreed under any circumstances. Benevolence is 
understood as an act of charity in general and can be seen as an action including goodwill towards the 
other party. Thereby, trust-based governance refers to the strictness of an informal contract on an inter-
organizational sphere, which leads to a measure of the closeness of collaboration (De Reuver and 
Bouwman, 2011). 
In sum, we find all core concepts of governance configuration in every stakeholder relation (De Reuver 
and Bouwman 2011). The dominant configuration is authority-based governance where the owner is 
involved (owner to developer: 54%, owner to customer: 62%). Contract- and trust-based governance 
mechanisms appear in equal amounts. Additionally our analysis reveals that within all papers, authority 
as the stand-alone configuration appears 10 times, contractual configurations only once. In contrast, 
trust configurations are always paired with contracts or authority or both. Therefore, we support De 
Reuvers and Bouwmans (2011) results that a mixture of these configurations characterizes governance, 
even across different groups of stakeholders. 
We conclude that the lack of concretization of research on governance has to be criticized. Only eight 
of the 30 papers which are surveyed have intensively discussed the issue of governance and platforms. 
We define intensity in the context as the extent to which the paper contributes to the topic. This abstr ct 
discussion hampers the process of the maturation of the topic and consequently leads to a fragmentatio 
of knowledge and irritation of new researchers. Figure 3 summarizes our analysis. 
 
Table 2. Overview of the analysed literature  
5 A Framework for Mobile Platform Governance 
5.1 Derived Framework of Mobile Platform Governance   
We identified many different but closely connected concepts, derived in the research streams, which 
have been researched and have to be analyzed. Thus, we do now reflect our findings to build up mature 
knowledge. The framework can serve as a base for the investigation of the internal relationships 
between the elements, a guide for the analysis of existing platform governance and a basis for the 
establishment of new governance. 
Figure 3 shows our modularly built framework. It consists out of the main elements needed for a mobile 
service platform governance concept which is discussed in the latter. We regard platform governance as 
a process with different levels. The framework start  at the level of market structure. We assume 
changes in the market structure are triggered by several influencing factors like legal or technical 
changes. Resulting modifications in market structure further require changes in the governance 
configuration. These configuration changes have to be enforced by governance mechanisms and 
controlled by control mechanisms. In result one or more stakeholders are affected. If their behavior 
changes negatively the circle may begin and a new configuration of the governance has to be 
Legend
I = Intensity (low=1, high=3) GC= Governance Configuration 
O to Dev= Owner to developer 
Author Discipline Year Method I O to Dev O to Con O to Oth AB TB CB MS GC Co
Levina, 2002 IS 2002 Qualitative 1 1 1 1
West, 2003 ECN 2003 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1
Rochet and Tirole, 2003 ECN 2003 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Van Grembergen, 2004 IS 2004 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Demil and Lecocq, 2006 OS 2006 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1 1
Bergman et al., 2007 IS 2007 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1
Evans and Schmalensee, 2007 ECN 2007 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Methlie and Pedersen, 2007 IS 2007 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Brousseau and Penard, 2007 ECN 2007 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iyer et al., 2007 CS 2007 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1
Gawer and Henderson, 2007 ECN 2007 Qualitative 3 1 1 1 1
Markus, 2007 IS 2007 Qualitative 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tiwana, 2009 IS 2009 Quantitative 2 1 1 1 1
Robey et al., 2008 IS 2008 Qualitative 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Parker and Van Alstyne, 2008 IS 2008 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
De Reuver, 2009 IS 2009 Quantitative 3 1 1 1 1 1
Jansen et al., 2009 IS 2009 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1
Holzer and Ondrus, 2009 IS 2009 Qualitative 3 1 1 1 1
Tee and Gawer, 2009 ECN 2009 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1
Ballon, 2009 IS 2009 Mixed 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2010 * IS 2010 Qualitative 3 1 1 1 1 1
Schlagwein et al., 2010 IS 2010 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1 1
Tiwana et al., 2010 * IS 2010 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1 1
De Reuver et al., 2011 * ECN 2011 Qualitative 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
Müller et al., 2011 IS 2011 Qualitative 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Eaton et al., 2011 IS 2011 Qualitative 2 1 1
Jain, 2011 IS 2011 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1
Querbes-Revier, 2011 ECN 2011 Qualitative 1 1 1 1 1
Rudmark and Ghazawneh, 2011 IS 2011 Qualitative 3 1 1 1 1 1 1
Basole and Karla, 2011* IS 2011 Qualitative 1 1 1 1
Co = Control 
O to Oth = Owner to Other
O to Con = Owner to Consumer
AB = Authority-based 
TB= Trust-based 
CB= Contract-based 
MS = Market Structure 
developed. During our research we learned that knowledge on the relations between the different 
governance levels and elements is sparse. The remainder of this chapter sums up our findings. 
 
Figure 3. Framework for the analysis and implementation of platform governance 
5.2 Market Structure 
At the top of the framework, the market structure consists of many different aspects (e.g. economics of 
scale, quality assurance, openness, distribution mode, TCE, etc.) (Brousseau and Penard, 2007; Müller 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, we identify implications on technology aspects dealing with the question 
where to settle for computational power or how the architecture for application development should be 
established (e.g. by using SDKs, APIs, etc.) (De Reuver et al., 2010; Tee and Gawer, 2009). This seems 
to be reasonable as market structures like the pricing model have to be aligned with the governance 
configuration and mechanisms. Going along, we define market structure as a business model for mobile 
platform, which includes all the formal and informal rules for the exchange and value creation on the 
platform, set up by the owner. 
Therefore, we determine the market structure as a link to our strategic level of the platform. Take th 
platform by RIM as an example. RIM provides a high level of security to their customers, since 
confidentiality is critical in corporate settings. To implement this strategy the owner must configure 
the platform accordingly. For that reason it is of great importance to the owner to acquire the right 
policy of power division to retain control over the platform on the one hand and to avoid hampering 
the innovation process on the other (De Reuver and Bouwman, 2011; Jansen et al., 2009; Parker and 
Van Alstyne, 2008; Rudmark and Ghazawneh, 2011; Sarkar et al., 1998). Derived from table 2, the 
owner uses his power over the platform in 89,9 percent of the cases to implement the decisions made 
in these areas, according to literature. Hence, we conclude that the governance configuration has to be 
derived from the market structure.  
5.3 Governance Configuration 
The constituted governance configuration must be imple ented to manage consumer experience (Jain, 
2011). Methlie and Pederson (2007) state that platform governance is a sub form of the market 
structure. We define governance configuration as an organizing logic derived from the market 
structure (Chesbrough, 2003), implementing the formal and informal rules by tangible governance 
mechanisms. For better illustration we divide it into three abstract areas. The integration aspects area 
deals with the implementation of decisions using the architecture resources of the platform (e.g. 
security restrictions on coding, standardization, etc.) (De Reuver et al., 2010; Tee and Gawer, 2009). 
Furthermore governance focuses on the relationships between the stakeholders, the network 
externalities and the external factors, which we det rmine as ecosystem aspects. At last power aspects 
provide the means to implement the owner’s power strategy. All areas have to be perfectly aligned to 
the market (Tee and Gawer, 2009; Tiwana et al., 2010). Hence, a set of numerous, different 
mechanisms is derived from the configuration (Demil and Lecocq, 2006). We refer to the design and 
implementation of this configuration as a process. In this context mechanisms resemble tangible 
manifestations of the market structure. De Reuver and Bowman (2011) classify three, not mutually 
exclusive mechanisms. While the division into the abstract core items Contract-based, Power-based 
and Trust-based is reasonable (De Reuver and Bouwman, 2011), no indications could be found on 
how to mix and implement the analysed governance mechanisms to enforce the aspects of a 
governance configuration. 
5.4 Control Mechanisms 
Finally we find that the importance of means to measure impacts of governance has yet been 
overlooked by most of the researchers. There is a gre t need to be able to flexibly align the platform 
with its ecosystem in order to achieve success (De Reuver et al., 2010; Van Grembergen, 2004). 
Control mechanisms provide the means for this approach. In the literature, only few proposals for 
palpable controls are made. Besides controls are the major toll to manifest the power of the platform 
owner (Ballon, 2009). We define control mechanisms as the means to monitor the ecosystem, take 
action on changes in the platform’s ecosystem and to retain the owner’s predominance. 
In general their implementation depends on the degree of desired measurement. If you want to know 
the effect of one governance configuration, you have to derive a set of controls to fully grasp its 
impact. As we cope with a non-linear ecosystem an empirical analysis of this approach extends far 
beyond legible time and effort. In consequence the establishment of means to measure the outcome of 
the set of governance mechanisms is a far better appro ch. Take for example an original equipment 
manufacturer who wants to increase the sales quantity of his devices. He would want to raise the value 
of his devices perceived by the customers and is therefore mainly focused on consumer acceptance 
which can easily be measured by purchase surveys or othe  approaches. This resembles a form of 
outcome control. In accordance with Ouchi (1979), Wiesche et al. (2011) further differentiate between 
behavioural-, input- and social control. We exemplarily assigned some of the controls mentioned in 
the literature to our framework. Incentives as named by Parker and Van Alstyne (2008) are classified 
as behavioural control, SDK's as mentioned by Ghazawneh and Henfridson (2010) and Tiwana et al. 
(2010) as outcome control. Input control refers to access control of developers in a platform (Markus, 
2007). At last, social control in the manner of forexample boards are mentioned by Ghazawneh and 
Henfridson (2010). 
All in all the embedding of governance in this surro nding brings up a new view on platform 
governance as it reveals a process in the form of a circle. Starting, governance can be analysed by 
control mechanisms which provide feedback to be ablto adjust the owner’s market structure and the 
governance configuration. This in turn will affect the platforms ecosystem which must be measured 
again. Thereby the ability to flexibly adjust to changes in the ecosystem is implemented. In sum, this 
leads to a framework, which enables the creation of effective governance for a mobile platforms, as 
presented in figure 3. 
6 Conclusion and further research opportunities 
In this paper we provide an overview of the current k owledge on platform governance. Our 
descriptive analysis identifies in which disciplines the topic emerged and which areas of research 
currently treat the topic of platform governance. This knowledge allows future researchers to restrict 
their research and thereby to apply an in-depth analysis in these fields. We conclude that, although 
research significance of the publications in the ref rence discipline economics is declining, researchers 
should not neglect the previous findings. Furthermore, some limitations apply to our study: the 
comprehensiveness of the results is strongly associated with our choice of keywords. A second 
limitation arises from the focus of the forward and backward search on the five most important papers. 
We combined results from different research streams nd derived a conceptualization of platform 
governance. Our conceptualization as a modular framework assists in better understanding the 
composition and implementation of governance and possible implications. Thus, we extend the 
framework proposed by Tiwana et al. (2010). In line with Basole and Karla (2011) and Haaker et al. 
(2006) we add customers as critical stakeholders. Additionally, we examined and detailed the topic 
“control” in the context of platform governance, as it was generally mentioned only by Tiwana et al. 
(2010).  Derived from our findings, we finally propse four research issues in the context of platform 
governance: Although several authors consider governance mechanisms like SDKs to be directly 
influencing developers, there is no understanding about the consequences of their implementation. The 
impacts of these mechanisms on the willingness of developers to participate are yet unclear. We could 
only identify one qualitative interpretive study about motivational factors for participating in a 
platform. Holzer and Ondrus (2009) consider market size and accessibility, career opportunities, and 
creative freedom as motivation factors for third party platform developers. However, there is no 
insight on how market size affects the perception or acceptance of creative freedom. Consequently, the 
impact of governance on participant’s motivation as an important factor of platform success needs to 
be further researched. 
Additionally, as only three of thirty papers did not discuss authority-based governance, we identified 
this governance mechanism as predominant in governing platforms. In contrast, authority is presumed 
to be an obstacle for innovation and the lifespan of an ecosystem (Eaton et al., 2011; Jansen et al., 
2009). As innovation should be enhanced by platform p ovision, this relationship should be examined 
critically. Our analysis illustrates that governance is often applied as a mixture of trust-, contract-and 
authority-based mechanisms which are also often multidimensional. Studying how the analysed 
governance configuration influences the success of platforms would enable a more proactive 
development of mobile service platforms.  
Our framework illustrates a fully integrated view of platform governance. After our analysis, we 
consider controls as a monitoring tool to evaluate the effectiveness of governance mechanisms which 
typify the governance configuration and are consequently aligned to the market structure. Although 
controls are recognized as an important factor for the monitoring of governance mechanisms, it is 
unknown which controls have to be applied for which governance mechanism or mechanism mix. We 
found only one intangible, not empirically evaluated approach by Ghazahweh and Henfridsson (2010) 
which considers the adaption of governance mechanisms by monitoring. Since, only correctly 
employed controls allow a proactive management of the platform elements, we suggest further 
analysis in this field.  
The usage of our framework for conducting case studies, which examines how control mechanisms are 
aligned to governance configurations and market structu e, seems to be a promising approach. 
Especially platform owners could provide valuable insights. Further case studies allow contributing to 
the knowledge on the gaps between the levels of the framework. Therefore, as a research agenda, we 
propose to conduct several empirical case studies to obtain evidence on how governance and control 
mechanisms should be selected and used for aligning them to the overall platform. 
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